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ABSTRACT
This MENG thesis implements a security system for a classroom presentation system
called the Classroom Learning Partner (CLP). The goal of the security system is to
prevent cheating on electronic quizzes. CLP is a system that uses Tablet PCs in the
classroom to enhance learning and encourage interaction between the instructor and
students. The instructor creates exercises which are displayed on slides on the students'
Tablet PCs. The students complete the exercises and submit them to the instructor and to
a central database. The security implementation makes it possible to extend this
framework for electronic quiz administration. This thesis discusses current cheating
prevention methodologies and extends them to account for electronic quiz-taking
scenarios. The basis of the security system is SQL Server authentication for
authentication to a central database, and SSL for encryption of network traffic.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this project is to implement a security infrastructure for an educational
technology, Classroom Learning Partner (CLP) in order to administer quizzes
electronically during class. The main goal is to help ensure the validity of the quizzes by
preventing cheating. The CLP infrastructure prevents cheating in two ways: by enforcing
authentication to the system and by encryption of network traffic.
There are a number of system components that contribute to the security of CLP. It is
crucial that each component of the system and all traffic between each component be
protected, so that an unauthorized party cannot access and modify private data. This
protection is achieved by requiring authentication to each component, and by encrypting
traffic. The system uses SQL Server authentication and SSL for encryption. Denial of
service and nonrepudiation are not addressed.
This project is valuable, not only because of the benefit for deployments planned for the
academic year 20006-2007, but also because of the potential for future enhancements and
developments, such as automated quiz grading.
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2 Classroom Learning Partner
Classroom Learning Partner (CLP) is a system being developed with the goal of
improving student learning in the classroom. It will allow for increased interaction
between the instructor and students. [Koile and Singer, 2006a] and [Koile and Singer,
2006b] show that students who used this system did better in an introductory computer
science class than students who did not use the system.
Classroom Learning Partner employs Tablet PCs to provide the instructor with immediate
feedback from students working exercises in-class and wirelessly submitting anonymous
answers to the instructor. The system allows the instructor to create questions that are
displayed on slides on the students' Tablet PCs. The students' answers are submitted to a
database, where an aggregator then combines them into equivalence classes. The
aggregated answers are sent to the instructor, who can use them to assess the students'
understanding of the material presented thus far and pace the class accordingly [Koile
and Shrobe, 2005] & [Koile and Singer, 2006b].
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2.1 CLP System Architecture
The system is currently being developed by the CLP group, headed by Dr. Kimberle
Koile, at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. It consists of
the following main components:
" Instructor Authoring Tool (IAT) , which helps the instructor create slides and
exercises.
* Ink Interpreter, which interprets the student's handwritten answers by producing
semantic representations. [Rbeiz, 2006]
* Aggregator, which groups the student answers into equivalence classes using the
semantic representations produced by the interpreter. [Smith, 2006]
The current version of the Instructor Authoring Tool was implemented by CLP group members Kevin
Chevalier, Capen Low, Michel Rbeiz, and Kenneth Wu. [Chen, 2006] describes an earlier implementation.
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The following diagram illustrates the architecture of the system.
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Figure 1: Steps 1-8 represent the process of using Classroom Learning Partner
1. Before class, the instructor creates a PowerPoint presentation and a set of exercise
objects using the CLP authoring tool. The exercise information is both embedded
in the slides and stored as a separate object in the database.
2. Prior to class, the instructor retrieves the presentation from the database. The
instructor also may store the presentation on his or her tablet and use the central
database for archival.
3. Presentation slides are broadcast to student machines or students' machines
automatically load them from a file server or the central database.
4. When a slide containing an exercise is displayed, each student enters ink answer,
which is interpreted on his or her machine.
5. Each student's ink answer is submitted to the database.
6. Aggregator retrieves the interpreted ink answers, aggregates them, and produces
summary data.
7. Summary data is stored in the database.
8. Summary data is displayed on the instructor's machine.
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2.2 Current Implementation
The first version of Classroom Learning Partner is functioning and has been deployed in
the classroom. The following is a description of a classroom scenario.
* The student walks into class, picks up tablet, and logs in with MIT username and
password
* The tablet connects to MIT to authenticate (using Kerberos user name and
password), gets a ticket and user name
* CLP on the tablet logs student into Windows system as "student" user name
" A script on the tablet creates a link to the student's MIT directory, configures
services for the MIT user name, adds an entry to the database (database
CLPRecords, table TabletRecords) with user name and time of log in, and starts
up CLP. The entry serves as a mapping between student and machine names 2
Figure 2 shows an example of the table in the database.
2 Student answers to in-class exercises are still anonymous. The instructor is unaware of the mapping
between student and machine names. The information is used only by an educational assessment expert
when investigating student performance.
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* CLP on the tablet downloads slides from the instructor's website automatically
(because storing the slides on a file server proved to be the fastest).
* The student clicks connect
* The tablet connects to the virtual classroom set up by CLP for wireless
communication
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* The student views slides
* The instructor displays a slide containing an exercise
" The exercise slide shows up on each student's tablet. Figure 3 shows an example
of a slide that is displayed on the tablet during a class.
"Your turn"
The following expressions evaluate to values of what type?
(Ilabda (a h c) 1f > f (+ b b
Figure 3
* The student works the exercise, writing an answer in digital ink with a tablet
stylus pen in the answer box provided (Figure 4) and presses submit
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ILl
"Your turn"
The following expressions evaluate to values of what type?
( Iabd (a b c) (it (> a 0) (+ b c) (- h c)
(lambda (p) (it p "hi" "bye"))
(~3.14 (* 2 5))
Figure 4
" CLP on the tablet collects the ink and passes it to the ink interpreter
" The ink interpreter returns a semantic representation of the ink
" CLP on the tablet creates student answer object, transfers student answer object to
database (database IAT, table Answers and table StudentAnswers) over TCP and
transfers answer to instructor over RTP
* The instructor gets student answers
* When the aggregator is running on the instructor machine, the instructor does not
get all the student answers, but rather only the representative ones released by the
aggregator.
See figure 5 for a diagram illustrating the above scenario.
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3 Quiz-taking Issues
The purpose of this MENG thesis is to design the security for CLP so that it can be used
to administer quizzes electronically in class. CLP already provides the instructor with the
framework to create and distribute exercises electronically in class, so quiz administration
is a natural addition. When designing the security system, it is important to look at the
current quiz-taking model and expand upon it for the electronic quiz-taking scenario.
Electronic quiz-taking offers numerous advantages over conventional quiz-taking
methodologies. Certain tasks, such as distribution, collection, and scoring of quizzes,
could be automated when a quiz is administered electronically [Dyreson, 1996]. This
functionality would allow the instructor more time to focus on improving student learning
and less time on quiz administration. Another advantage with electronic quiz
administration is that it would be easy to collect statistics from the quiz [Dyreson, 1996].
The statistics could be used to determine student improvement in the class as well as
overall class performance on a particular question or style of question. Finally, electronic
quizzes could facilitate testing specifically in computer science classes by allowing
students to write code in the same environment that they use for homework and projects.
While electronic quiz-taking does offer some advantages over conventional quiz-taking,
it is not without its costs. Electronic quiz-taking provides increased opportunities for
students to cheat, and students may cheat in more creative ways that are harder for
instructors to detect.
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3.1 Problem: Cheating/Benefits?
According to Davis [Davis, 1993], between 40 and 70 percent of college students have
cheated at some point. Evidence suggests that if students are given the opportunity to
cheat, they will take it [Bushweller, 1999]. Cheating is dishonest and prevents the
cheating student from understanding the material to his full potential. Therefore, it is
very important for teachers to do all that they can to prevent cheating. While there are
many forms of cheating, this thesis focuses on how to prevent cheating on in-class
quizzes.
3.1.1 Conventional quiz-taking
The traditional classroom quiz-taking scenario involves students taking a quiz on paper
while the instructor or other proctor watches to make sure that no student is cheating.
The following is a list of ways in which students may cheat:
a) Access the answers dishonestly during the quiz
a. Copy off of another student
b. Bring a source to copy from
i. Cheat sheet
ii. Writing on hand
iii. Electronic device that contains the answers
c. Communicate with a source outside of the classroom
b) Change either answer or score after the quiz [Bushweller, 1999]
c) Access quiz questions before the quiz [Bushweller, 1999]
a. Break in to location where quiz is stored and steal a copy of the quiz
b. Break the seal on a section of the quiz ahead of time [Bushweller,
1999]
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c. Pass quiz questions of a standardized quiz to students in a later time
zone
d. Give questions to students in a later class
d) Impersonate a student in the class and take the quiz in his place
3.1.2 Electronic quiz-taking
The electronic quiz-taking scenario involves students taking a quiz on an electronic
device that may or may not have the capability to connect to the internet or other devices
that students are using. For our purposes, each student will take the quiz on an individual
electronic device. The devices have some sort of network connectivity through which the
students obtain quiz questions, prove their identity, and submit quiz answers. Cheating in
the electronic quiz-taking scenario is fundamentally the same as in the conventional
scenario, however there are new opportunities for students to revise and expand upon
conventional cheating methodologies.
Let's revisit the ways that students cheat and examine how technology affects the
scenarios.
a) Access the answers dishonestly during the quiz
a. In addition to the conventional cheating methods described above,
students also have the following possibilities of cheating at their disposal
i. A student may attempt to access the quiz answers from a database
or instructor's machine where they are stored, or another student's
machine after he answers the questions.
ii. A student may attempt to use the device that the quiz is being
taken on to communicate with other students in or out of the class.
iii. A student may try to view another student's answers over the
network traffic.
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b) Change either answer or score after the quiz [Bushweller, 1999]
a. There are potentially more ways a student can do this in the electronic
scenario.
c) Access quiz questions before the quiz [Bushweller, 1999]
a. There are more ways to do this in the electronic scenario, one of which is
to eavesdrop on the network when the instructor submits/reads the
exercises and answers to/from the database.
d) Have a friend impersonate a student in the class and take the quiz in his place
a. This method might be easier to do in the electronic case since some
electronic quiz-taking scenarios may not require that the student be present
in a classroom.
3.2 Solution
There are a number of solutions to prevent cheating. We look at some of the
conventional methods and discuss how they can be applied to the electronic scenario.
3.2.1 Conventional solutions
Teachers have developed methods to counter cheating. The methods are not all
foolproof, and each has its own advantages and disadvantages. The following is a list of
some of the methods.
a) Be alert during the quiz to make sure that students are not copying off of or
communicating with each other or using a cheat sheet or other device to get
the answers.
b) Keep backup records of the quiz and the scores.
a. Photocopy each student's quiz after the exam to make sure that they do
not change their incorrect answers after the quizzes are returned.
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b. Keep backup copies of the grade book so that if a student steals it and
modifies some grades, it will be easier to catch and fix the changes.
c) Ensure that the quizzes and quiz questions are secure before the exam and
change the quiz questions when another class is taking the same quiz later in
the day.
a. Teachers can prevent students from breaking in to a room where a
quiz is being stored by making sure that it is locked securely and
that all people with access to the room can be trusted to restrict
access from unauthorized people.
b. When a student broke the seal of the essay question on an ETS
administered test, ETS later wrapped the questions in cellophane to
deter students from opening it since there is a greater risk of
getting caught [Bushweller, 1999].
c. In order to prevent students form divulging quiz questions to other
students who are taking the quiz at a later time, instructors should
change the questions.
d) Quizzes should be proctored by an instructor who is familiar with the students
in order to prevent a student from impersonating a peer and taking the quiz in
his place. An alternative to this is to require all students to bring their id to the
quiz and use it as an authentication mechanism.
Many of these methods rely on students' fear of getting caught. That is, they will not
prevent cheating, but will make it likely that the student will get caught if he does cheat.
In most cases, the possibility of getting caught is enough to prevent cheating altogether.
3.2.2 Electronic Solutions
While electronic quiz-taking introduces new ways in which students can cheat, it also
provides the instructors with new ways to detect and prevent cheating. Most of the
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cheating situations that are introduced by the electronic quiz-taking scenario can be
prevented with a good authentication and encryption system.
The following describes how the instructors can enhance the methods to prevent cheating
with technology.
a) In addition to watching students in class to make sure that they are not
copying off of one another or a cheat sheet, ensure that all network traffic is
encrypted so that students cannot eavesdrop on the network traffic and view
each other's submissions.
b) Since all submissions are stored electronically, it is easier to store backup
copies.
c) A good authentication system will help prevent students from obtaining the
exam ahead of time. As an additional measure, instructors may set up a
system to determine if a break in has occurred.
d) Quizzes should be proctored by an instructor who is familiar with the students
in order to prevent a student from impersonating a peer and taking the quiz in
his place. An alternative to this is to require all students to bring their id to the
quiz and use it as an authentication mechanism.
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4 Preventing Cheating with CLP: Security System
Architecture
In order to use CLP to administer quizzes in class, the system must be fortified to prevent
cheating. The most important things to consider are data privacy and integrity, so that
only authorized users can access and participate in the quiz. These two properties are
achieved via authentication and encryption.
4.1 Authentication
In order to access any component of the system, it is necessary to authenticate to it. The
component then grants access based on the particular user's permissions. It is necessary
to employ a good authentication mechanism to ensure that the parties with access cannot
be impersonated. It is also necessary to have a strong system to set up permissions, so
that an impersonator cannot modify the access list (either by adding a new name or by
changing some existing permissions).
A good authentication system will prevent the following scenarios:
- A student accesses the instructor's computer to view the questions and/or answers
before class.
- A student accesses the database to view the questions and/or answers before class.
- A student accesses the instructor's computer during class to view the answers.
- A student accesses the database during class to view the answers.
- A student accesses another student's computer during class to view his answers.
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- A student accesses the database during class to view another student's answers.
- A student from another class accesses the database to view the questions before
his own class
4.2 Encryption
All traffic in the system must be encrypted. This encryption is necessary in order to
prevent eavesdroppers from obtaining information to which they are not entitled.
The following transmissions must be to encrypted:
a) Instructor sends exercises and answers to the database.
- The instructor does this task in preparation for the class, so if a student could view
this traffic, he would have access to the exercise questions and answers before
class.
b) Instructor reads exercises and answers from the database.
- If this traffic is viewed, it is the same scenario as above.
c) Instructor broadcasts slides to the students.
- Whether or not to encrypt this step is a design decision. The benefit of encrypting
this information is that it prevents students in other classes from viewing the
exercises.
d) Students submit answers to the database.
- This task prevents cheating that is equivalent to looking at another student's paper
in a traditional quiz setting. In a non-quiz setting, it could make some students
feel more comfortable to know that other students cannot see their answers.
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e) Instructor reads student answers from the database (either individually or in
aggregated form).
- If this traffic is viewed, it is the same scenario as above.
The following figure illustrates the above scenarios.
Classroom Learning Partner Architecture
ices &Exerc
kd~s &Exerd
-
4-
preted Ink 0
swats
Figure 6
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4.3 Outside Scope
Nonrepudiation is not addressed in the implementation of the system. Nonrepudiation is
a way to ensure that a message was sent and received. This would be a way to prevent a
student from claiming that he did not receive a quiz question.
This system does not protect against a denial of service attack. A denial of service attack
floods a system so that it can no longer function. A student might attempt this attack if
he decides he would rather not take the quiz that day. Neither of these issues has been
addressed.
The quiz-taking scenario addressed in this thesis requires that the quiz is administered
with the students in the classroom. It is necessary to consider addition scenarios in order
to secure a quiz that is taken from a remote location.
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5 Design Choices and Implementation
As mentioned earlier, this MENG thesis implements a security system for CLP that
consists of authentication and encryption. The following is a description of the sequence
when CLP is used for quiz administration:
1. The instructor or database administrator creates a new password for the student
account in the database. (see appendix for instructions on how to do this, or
should I put instructions somewhere else?).
2. The student walks in to class and picks up a tablet from the front of the
classroom. Note that the tablets are in the control of the instructor between
classes, so she can control the tablet settings and what programs are installed
before class.
3. The student logs in to the tablet with his MIT Athena user name and password.
4. The tablet connects to MIT and logs the student in to Athena via the Kerberos
system.
5. Once the MIT Athena credentials are verified, the student is logged in to
Windows under the user name "student". All students will be logged in to the
tablet as "student".
6. Next, a script runs which adds an entry to the database (database CLPRecords,
table TabletRecords) with the user name, tablet name, and time of log in of the
student and starts up CLP.
7. At this point, the slides are downloaded onto the tablet.
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8. The student starts up CLP and connects to the classroom. When prompted for a
password, the student enters the password assigned by the instructor.
9. The student takes the quiz by viewing the quiz questions on the slides and
answering them in an answer box provided. Once the student is satisfied with his
answer, he presses submit. This causes the student's identity to be checked and
if it is verified, the answer is encrypted with SSL and submitted to the database.
The student can resubmit his answer as many times as he would like. The
instructor should instantiate a policy of how to deal with multiple submissions.
One reasonable policy is to only look at the latest submission. This is similar to
conventional quiz-taking, where a student may cross out or erase his answer, so
the instructor only sees the latest one.
10. The instructor or database administrator should change the student password
immediately after class so that no student can log in again.
The password should be changed at the end of class so that students cannot submit
new answers after class. As long as the students are only allowed to insert answers,
changing the password is not a critical issue: if the students don't have the ability to
delete, and a timestamp is submitted with each insert, the instructor will see when an
answer was submitted and can disregard answers submitted after the quiz ended.
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5.1 Authentication
Students authenticate to the database using SQL Server authentication. Currently,
anyone with an MIT account can log in to a CLP tablet during class with his Athena user
name and password. When CLP starts up, a login prompt appears that asks the user for
his user name and password. This information is saved in the CLP code and used to
authenticate the student when he submits an answer to the database.
SQL Authentication versus Windows Authentication
In general, it is recommended to use Windows authentication over SQL authentication
when authenticating to an MS SQL Server 2000 database since Windows authentication
has many of the security considerations built in and automatically configured. However,
Windows authentication is not possible for the current classroom architecture, since each
student does not have a distinct Windows account that he is logged in to.
One disadvantage of using SQL Server authentication is that the password travels over
the network in clear text. It must be encrypted so that no one can eavesdrop on the
network packets and see the password. We use SSL to encrypt the password and solve
this problem. This encryption does not add any overhead over using Windows
authentication since even Windows authentication still necessitates encryption of all other
network traffic.
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Student Database Accounts
It is important to ensure that each user connects to the database with an account that has
the fewest privileges necessary for him to accomplish what he needs. Each student will
log in to the database with a password supplied at the beginning of class. The student's
account will only have the capability to insert into the database and not to read ot delete
entries.
The student account should be created and maintained by the instructor, teaching
assistant, or other administrator who would normally have access to student records. As
mentioned earlier, in the current implementation, there is one student account with which
every student logs in. Students are distinguished from each other by mapping their
Athena user name to their tablet name and storing that information in another table in the
database. This is done with a script that automatically runs on the tablet when the
students log in. It is a bit awkward to have the students' identifying information in a
separate database, so it might be beneficial to create an individual database account for
each student in the class.
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5.2 Encryption
All communications with the SQL Server are encrypted with SSL 3. This encryption
prevents an unauthorized person from viewing network traffic. A server certificate 4 is
installed on the computer on which the SQL Server database resides, and the database is
set up to only allow encrypted connections. Whenever a client connects to the SQL
Server, the connection and all traffic between the client and server will be encrypted with
SSL.
SQL Server 2000 supports both SSL and IPSec for encryption. In order to use IPSec, all
client machines must have a static IP address. It is also necessary to configure every
machine in the network to use IPSec. SSL does not have this administrative overhead.
The only setup necessary for SSL encryption is on the server machine, thus making it
easy to add new client machines to the system.
3 See [] for a description of how SSL works.
4 The server certificate is obtained from the CSAIL Certificate Authority.
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5.3 Vulnerabilities
The system specification requires that the instructor change the student password
immediately after class. This means that if a student finishes the quiz early and leaves
class, the password that was given in class will still be valid. The student may try to
access the database remotely and add a new submission before the instructor changes the
password. In order to do this, the student would need to know on which machine the
SQL Server is running, which database and table on the SQL Server contains the
student's quiz submissions, and how to access the table and insert new entries. It is
unlikely that the student would obtain all this information. However, it is important to
note that if he does, the system could be compromised. An important and not difficult
addition to the system would be a mechanism for having the system automatically change
the password after all students have logged in.
When a student first logs in to the tablet, a script runs that does two things: it mounts the
user's Athena directory on the tablet (as a new device) and inserts an entry, which pairs
student user names with machine id, into the TabletRecords table in the CLPRecords
database on the SQL Server. A student may try to cheat by accessing files in his or her
Athena directory. It is important, therefore, that the part of the script that mounts the
student's Athena directory be removed. Note that access to the directory may not be a
problem if the quiz is open notes, depending on the instructor's wishes. The other
potential vulnerability in the script is that it needs to access the database to insert the
mapping between the student user name and machine name. The script uses its own
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account, but the user name and password is displayed in the script. If the students know
where the script is located on the computer, they could look at it to obtain the user name
and password and use that to insert a new entry into the table that maps their user name to
a different machine. The script account only has permission to insert new entries and not
to delete or read entries, so that helps to prevent further unauthorized access.
In the current system configuration, students can still access the internet during class, and
therefore, potentially communicate with each other or other students outside of class to
cheat. This communication can be prevented easily with a firewall that is set up to only
allow the necessary connections. Another option is to leave the system as is and monitor
the network traffic to make sure that students are not communicating with each other.
This approach is similar to the current cheating prevention model at MIT, since although
there is no way to guarantee that the students will be honest, the fear of getting caught is
usually enough to prevent cheating, and MIT does have an academic honesty policy in
place to which students are expected to adhere.
All of the above vulnerabilities are easily addressed and will be considered in the next
version of the system.
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6 Testing
The system was tested in a mock classroom setting with one instructor and 2 student
tablets5 . The "quiz" is stored on the Desktop of the tablet. Each student logs in to
CLP with the given username and password and loads the quiz from the Desktop.
The students submit their answers by pressing the submit button in CLP. The quiz
testing was done twice: once with encryption disabled and once with it enabled.
Figure 7 shows the TabletRecords table in the CLPRecords database, which contains
the mapping from a student's computer name to his Kerberos name.
Figure 7
5 It was also tested with more than 2 student tablets, however for simplicity of the documentation, I discuss
a scenario with 2 student tablets.
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ComputerName Kerberos ame L ogifnie
CLP16 karin 9/7/2006 8:16:57 PM
CLP1O karin 9/7/2006 8:17:11 PM
CLP2 student 9/7/2006 8:17:17 PM
CLP1O karin 9/7/2006 8:41:56 PM
CLP16 karin 9/7/2006 8:42:17 PM
CLP1O karin 9/7/2006 8:45:24 PM
CLP2 student 9/7/2006 8:45:30 PM
CLP1O karin 9/7/2006 8:52:11 PM
CLP2 student 9/7/2006 8:52:16 PM
CLP1O karin 9/7/2006 8:54:36 PM
CLP2 student 9/7/2006 8:54:41 PM
CLP16 karin 9/7/2006 8:54:49 PM
CLP1O karin 9/8/2006 4:44:07 PM
CLP2 karin 9/8/2006 11:21:10 PM
CLP16 student 9/8/2006 11:21:15 PM
CLP16 student 9/8/2006 11:24:06 PM
CLP2 karin 9/8/2006 11:26:59 PM
CLP16 student 9/8/2006 11:28:06 PM
CLP1O karin 9/8/2006 11:28:11 PM
CLP2 karin 9/8/2006 11:47:23 PM
Figure 8 shows the ink student submissions.
Figure 8
As you can see, the student using CLP16 wrote "test student" and the student using
CLP1O wrote "test karin". These exercises were submitted in an unencrypted
session. Figures 9 and 10 show the submissions in the database. The
StudentAnswers table in the IAT database (figure 9) shows that the student using
CLP16 has submitted an answer, which is identified by the AnswerID 233 and the
student using CLP10 has submitted an answer identified by AnswerID 234.
23CLP16 142 9/8/2006 11:30:25
234 CLPIO 142 918/2006 11:30:35
Figure 9
The AnswerlDs 233 and 234 and the semantic representations that correspond to
their ink answer can be found in the Answers table in the IAT database (figure 10).
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ype="5TRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi</Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="5TRING" Confidence="Strong">to<lChunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">you</Chunk></Answer>
ype="5TRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi</Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">Ni</Chunk></Answer>
ype="5TRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">to</Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">you<lChunk></Answer>
ype="5TRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi student</Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="5TRING" Confidence="Strong">hi Karin</Chunk><fAnswer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi student</Chunk><Answer >
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi student<Chunk><Answer >
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">test student</Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">test Karin</Chunk><jAnswer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="5trong">123</Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">123756</Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">(1 12)<IChunk><Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">(434)<Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">student</Chunk></Answer>
ype="5TRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">Karin</Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">123</Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">456</Chunk></Answer>
ype="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">#12)</Chunk><Answer>
voe="STRING"><Chunk Tvoe="STRING" Confidence="Poor">(5*34)<Chunk><Answer>
Figure 10
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fnsy
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
BoxIndex
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binary>
<Binarv>
The same thing was done with encryption enabled. Figures 11 and 12 show the tables in
the encrypted session. The student answers can be seen in the database in figure 10 in
AnswerIDs 239 and 240.
Figure 11
AnwrD MachineID SessionlD TimeStamp
240 CLPIO 143 91/2006 11:49:12
241 CLP16 143 91812006 11:49:32 v
Figure 12
Notice that there is no difference in how the answers are stored in the database in the
encrypted and unencrypted versions. We must examine the network traffic in order
to see the difference.
The following two network traces show the unencrypted traffic when the Athena
name to tablet name mapping is made in the database. Notice how easy it is to see
that the database name is CLPRecords. Also notice how the SQL statement
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"INSERT INTO TabletRecords VALUES ('CLP10','karin',GETDATE()" is visible
in the second trace.
0000 00 Of bO 71 61 67 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 08 00 45 00 ... qag.. ?5... .E.
0010 01 b1 05 63 40 00 80 06 be 69 80 1e la 47 80 1e ... c@....-i...G..
0020 la f7 05 99 fO 82 lb 9c f4 49 eb b b7 ab 50 18 ......... I....P.
0030 fd 33 37 le 00 00 04 01 01 89 00 33 01 00 e3 23 .37........3...#
0040 00 01 Oa 43 00 4c 00 50 00 52 00 65 00 63 00 6f ... C.L.P.R.e.c.o
0050 00 72 00 64 00 73 00 06 6d 00 61 00 73 00 74 00 .r.d.s..m.a.s.t.
0060 65 00 72 00 ab 6e 00 45 16 00 00 02 00 29 00 43 e.r..n.E.....).c
0070 00 68 00 61 00 6e 00 67 00 65 00 64 00 20 00 64 .h.a.n.g.e.d. .d
0080 00 61 00 74 00 61 00 62 00 61 00 73 00 65 00 20 .a.t.a.b.a.s.e.
0090 00 63 00 6f 00 6e 00 74 00 65 00 78 00 74 00 20 .c4.
OOa0 00 74 00 6f 00 20 00 27 00 43 00 4c 00 50 00 52 .0. .'..L.P
00bO 00 65 00 63 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00 73 00 27 00 2e ke.c.o.r.d.s.'.
OOcO 00 08 41 00 4d 00 41 00 4e 00 44 00 41 00 43 00 .. N. .
OOdO 53 00 00 00 00 e3 08 00 07 05 09 04 dO 00 34 00 5.............4.
OOeO e3 17 00 02 Oa 75 00 73 00 5f 00 65 00 6e 00 67 ...... u.s._.e.n.g00fO 00 6c 00 69 00 73 00 68 00 00 ab 6a 00 47 16 00 .1.i.s.h... j.G..
0100 00 01 00 27 00 43 00 68 00 61 00 6e 00 67 00 65 ... '.C.h.a.n.g.e
0110 00 64 00 20 00 6c 00 61 00 6e 00 67 00 75 00 61 .d. .1.a.n.g.u.a
0120 00 67 00 65 00 20 00 73 00 65 00 74 00 74 00 69 .g.e. .s.e.t.t.i
0130 00 6e 00 67 00 20 00 74 00 6f 00 20 00 75 00 73 .n.g. .t.o. .u.s
0140 00 5f 00 65 00 6e 00 67 00 6c 00 69 00 73 00 68 ._.e.n.g.1.i.s.h
0150 00 2e 00 08 41 00 4d 00 41 00 4e 00 44 00 41 00 ... .A.M.A.N.D.A.
0160 43 00 53 00 00 00 00 ad 36 00 01 71 00 00 01 16 c.5.....6..q..
0170 4d 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 6f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 M.i.c.r.o.s.o.t.
0180 74 00 20 00 53 00 51 00 4c 00 20 00 53 00 65 00 t. .5.Q.L. .S.e.
0190 72 00 76 00 65 00 72 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 07 f7 r.v.e.r.........
OlaO e3 13 00 04 04 34 00 30 00 39 00 36 00 04 34 00 ..... 4.0.9.6. .4.
OlbO 30 00 39 00 36 00 fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0.9.6..........
0000 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 00 Of bO 71 61 67 08 00 45 00 .. ? ..... qag..E.
0010 00 aa 02 47 40 00 7f 06 c3 8c 80 1e la f7 80 1e ...G@...........
0020 la 47 fo 82 05 99 eb bi b7 ab lb 9c f5 d2 50 18 .G. ....... P.
0030 42 b4 f3 9e 00 00 01 01 00 82 00 00 01 00 49 00 .............
0040 4e 00 53 00 45 00 52 00 54 00 20 00 49 00 4e 00 N.S.E.R.T. I.N.
0050 54 00 4f 00 20 00 54 00 61 00 62 00 6c 00 65 0 T.O. .T.a.b.l.e.
0060 74 00 52 00 65 00 63 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00 73 0 t.R.e.c.o.r.d.s.
0070 20 00 56 00 41 00 4c 00 55 00 45 00 53 00 20 0 .V.A.L.U.E.5.
0080 28 00 27 00 43 00 4c 00 50 00 31 00 30 00 27 0 (. .C.L.P.1.0.
0090 2c 00 27 00 6b 00 61 00 72 00 69 00 6e 00 27 0 ,.'.k.a.r.i.n.
OOaO 2c 00 20 00 47 00 45 00 54 00 44 00 41 00 54 00 . .G.E.T.D.A.T.
ObO 45 00 28 00 29 00 29 00 .).).
Now look at the network trace when it is encrypted and notice how it is unreadable
without the key.
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0000 00 Of bO 71 61 67 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 08 00 45 00 ...qag..?s....E.
0010 01 c6 08 4f 40 00 80 06 bb 68 80 ie la 47 80 ie ... O@....h...G..
0020 la f7 05 99 fO 9e 79 89 cO 00 fa 21 26 50 50 18 ...... y.... !&PP.
0030 fd 35 37 33 00 00 17 03 01 01 99 Oa 36 99 7c 29 .573........6.1)
0040 58 b2 30 ba 39 6c bf 8f 27 03 38 7e 2e c6 e7 de X.0.91..'.8-....
0050 9b 5f 8c ci c3 44 e5 da 85 b b7 25 3d 66 60 7a ._...D.....%=f'Z
0060 3b 25 41 34 d8 27 9a 5b 99 7e 12 f6 30 42 86 16 ;%A4.'.[.-..OB..
0070 da 4a 5a c4 be 42 70 9f ce 9e 5d 12 d6 12 7a 35 .32..Bp...]. .. z5
0080 c8 36 a2 eO d3 ca c8 b2 2b la cd e5 ci 10 ba Ob .6......+........
0090 60 bb 01 af 50 dc c6 db 02 Oa 5b 64 df ef 24 06 .. .....
00a0 25 01 lb d9 fa 45 fe e8 91 07 ea 15 8d 21 e8 e5 ... E........
00bo 99 28 fa 97 a2 99 66 8d 4e 68 57 c4 33 2c ce ae f.NhW.3,..
00cO d3 a6 b3 43 f7 09 1b 5f 6d fc f1 8f b5 88 98 f3 .. _m...
COdO 28 62 38 9a 2b Ob aa cl ef be 9f f2 f9 f6 c3 23 (b8.+..........#
OOeO d9 e9 fl 37 c6 3a 63 78 fe 6f c2 87 95 a9 a7 be ...7.:cx.o......
00fO cd 86 b7 af cf 42 f5 fl 29 40 9a 5d af aO 02 a9 ..... B..)@.]....
0100 67 3b b8 19 31 fc 87 31 75 25 9f 86 lb 32 41 9c g;..1..iu%...2A.
0110 4e 05 67 c8 49 f3 3e 68 2e 08 62 d4 fo b2 30 e5 N.g.I.>h..b... 0.
0120 9f 8e 2d 6b 3c 3f 99 45 22 30 cd 86 ci 25 f2 19 ..-k<?.E"O...%..
0130 48 ci Id ea cc 92 4f e6 30 44 74 2c 71 00 b9 52 H.....O.ODtq..R
0140 ca 02 55 44 66 f4 a6 df a9 da f4 Oa ci 06 fc 54 ..UDf..........T
0150 21 23 64 9b 6d e5 cb 87 96 a9 85 a9 81 ec 71 79 !#d.m.........qy
0160 le la 85 50 3b e6 f5 6e cc 4b b2 bb 84 19 ci e2 ...P;..n.K......
0170 67 f8 65 7f 89 d5 c8 2d 74 a8 ec e2 7c aO al bd g.e....-t...I...
0180 3f 44 eb dc lb c5 dc bO fl e8 6f 5f 78 a7 Od 79 ?D........O-x..y
0190 Oc 3c 38 eO f2 b Ob 9b 8f 91 81 70 77 65 Ob 4a .<8........pwe.J
OiaO dd ed 46 b4 60 c9 eb 6b 63 95 18 c8 03 d4 58 53 ..F.'..kc.....xs
OibO e9 3e fc la 3a 99 93 46 7d cd b9 27 15 e3 3b la .>..:..F}..'..;.
OlcO 57 9d 58 b9 7c 18 ea el 26 7e 8a c3 a8 4b 68 7c W.X.| .. .&-...Khl
OldO ef b5 f2 e2 ....
0000 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 00 Of bO 71 61 67 08 00 45 00 ..? ..... qag..E.
0010 00 bd 23 5d 40 00 7f 06 a2 63 80 le la f7 80 le .. #]@.... c......
0020 la 47 fO 9e 05 99 fa 21 26 50 79 89 ci 9e 50 18 .G....!&Py...P.
0030 42 9f 3c 7b 00 00 17 03 01 00 90 51 f8 80 b3 b4 8.<{.......Q....
0040 33 36 d7 b4 43 eO c5 a4 8a ff ef 33 af 32 7a 86 36. ...... . .
0050 ed 02 6b 9d 7b 08 f3 6d ba 24 Of 81 54 2e bc ac . .{..m.$..T...
0060 a5 04 3f 85 aa 56 02 6b Od 76 c5 c9 17 99 4a 50 .. ?..V.k.v....JP
0070 27 51 fa 72 fa 9b 72 13 35 2d fb 32 96 f9 ff 63 'Q.r..r.5-.2.. .c
0080 94 f4 48 d2 c9 48 c7 42 bO 37 fc 85 ft 12 64 a .. H..H.B.7.... d.
0090 91 29 Id 7f b3 31 46 33 47 45 if 38 47 23 ec 7 .)... 1F3GE.8G#.t
OOaO 7c eb 36 20 Ob cc 05 70 e3 2f 32 4b b6 9c d3 1 1.6 ...p./2K....
ObO fc 7d 90 4f f5 11 f4 b3 76 ad 42 a3 e9 05 9d 35 .}.o....v.B....5
00cO 96 96 21 41 99 Oa 63 c7 69 7d f4 .!A..c.i}.
The same situation holds with the student submissions to the database. In the next
two examples, the SQL statement is sent in clear text, and in the last two, it is
encrypted.
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0000
0010
0020
0030
0040
0050
0060
0070
0080
0090
OOaO
00bo
00cO
00do
OOeO
QOf 0
0100
0110
0120
0130
0140
0150
0160
0170
0180
0190
OlaC
OlbO
olcO
Oldo
Oleo
Olf 0
0000
0010
0020
0030
0040
0050
0060
0070
0080
0090
OOaO
QObO
O0cO
OOdo
OOeO
Oofo0
0100
0110
0120
0130
00 3b 00 00 00 e7 38 00
00 31 00 20 00 69 00 6e
00 20 00 6e 00 76 00 61
00 72 00 28 00 35 00 29
00 12 3f
01 eb 05
la 47 fo
41 03 49
Oa 00 02
49 00 4e
4e 00 54
65 00 72
45 00 53
40 00 32
40 00 34
00 34 5a
2c 00 40
40 00 33
6e 00 61
40 00 34
68 00 61
00 31 00
00 26 04
00 02 00
do 00 34
00 72 00
00 53 00
00 3c 00
00 79 00
00 49 00
00 66 00
00 22 00
00 65 00
00 65 00
00 6e 00
00 77 00
00 12 3f
01 2e 05
la 47 fO
40 cO b3
Oa 00 02
49 00 4e
4e 00 54
65 00 6e
72 00 73
53 00 20
32 00 2c
45 00 54
53 02 ce 00 Of bo
21 40 00 7f 06 bf
87 05 99 8d 99 82
79 00 00 03 01 01
00 00 00 e7 58 00
00 53 00 45 00 52
00 4f 00 20 00 41
00 73 00 20 00 56
00 20 00 28 00 40
00 2c 00 20 00 40
00 29 00 3b 00 00
00 40 00 31 00 20
00 32 00 20 00 69
00 20 00 76 00 61
00 72 00 79 00 28
00 20 00 6e 00 76
00 72 00 28 00 39
00 26 04 04 04 00
04 00 00 00 00 02
00 00 02 40 00 34
b4 00 3c 00 41 00
20 00 54 00 79 00
54 00 52 00 49 00
43 00 68 00 75 00
70 00 65 00 3d 00
4e 00 47 00 22 00
69 00 64 00 65 00
50 00 6f 00 6f 00
73 00 74 00 20 00
6e 00 74 00 3c 00
6b 00 3e 00 3c 00
65 00 72 00 3e 00
53 02 ce 00 Of bo
23 40 00 7f 06 cO
87 05 99 8d 99 84
47 00 00 03 01 01
00 00 00 e7 74 00
00 53 00 45 00 52
00 4f 00 20 00 53
00 74 00 41 00 6e
00 20 00 56 00 41
00 28 00 40 00 31
00 20 00 40 00 33
00 44 00 41 00 54
71 61 67 08 00 45 00
2c 80 le la f7 80 le
54 ef ea 7c 98 50 18
06 00 00 01 00 ff ff
09 04 do 00 34 74 00
00 54 00 20 00 49 00
00 74 00 75 00 64 00
00 73 00 77 00 65 00
00 4c 00 55 00 45 00
00 2c 00 20 00 40 00
00 2c 00 20 00 47 00
00 45 00 28 00 29 00
09 04 do 00 34 38 00
00 74 00 2c 00 40 00
00 72 00 63 00 68 00
00 2c 00 40 00 33 00
00 69 00 6e 00 74 00 02 40 00 31 00 00 26 04
e9 00 00 00 02 40 00 32 00 00 e7 Oa 00 09 04
00 34 Oa 00 43 00 4c 00 50 00 31 00 36 00 02
00 33 00 00 26 04 04 8e 00 00 00
71 61 67 08
71 80 le la
49 ef ea 7c
c3 00 00 01
09 04 dO 00
00 54 00 20
00 6e 00 73
00 41 00 4c
00 31 00 2c
00 33 00 2c
00 e7 5a 00
00 69 00 6e
00 6e 00 74
00 72 00 62
00 32 00 29
00 61 00 72
00 30 00 29
00 00 02 40
40 00 33 00
00 00 e7 b4
6e 00 73 00
70 00 65 00
4e 00 47 00
6e 00 6b 00
22 00 53 00
20 00 43 00
6e 00 63 00
72 00 22 00
73 00 74 00
2f 00 43 00
2f 00 41 00
37
00 45 00
f7 80 le
55 50 18
00 ff ff
34 58 00
00 49 00
00 77 00
00 55 00
00 20 00
00 20 00
09 04 do
00 74 00
00 2c 00
00 69 00
00 2c 00
00 63 00
00 02 40
00 32 00
00 a5 02
00 09 04
77 00 65
3d 00 22
22 00 3e
20 00 54
54 00 52
6f 00 6e
65 00 3d
3e 00 74
75 00 64
68 00 75
6e 00 73
.. ?s ..... qag..E.
... !@ .... q.....
.G........I.. UP.
A.Iy.. ....
.... .. X... .4x.
I. 5.E.R.T. .I.
N. .0. .A.n.s w.
e r.s. .V.A.L.
.s. .( . ., .
.4. .; .. Z ....
.4Z.@.1. .i.n.t.
,.@.2 . .il.n.t.,..
@.3. .v.a.r.b.i.
n.a.r.y. (.2.).,.
@.4. .n.v.a.r.c.
h. a. r. (. 9. 0. )..@
.1..&.......@.2.
.&. . .@.3...
... @.4........
.4. .<.A.n.s.w.e
.r. .T.y.p.e.=."
.5.T.R.I.N.G. ">
.<.c.h.u.n.k. .T
.y.p.e.=.".5.T.
I.N.G.". .C.0.
f.i.d.e.n.c.e.
".P.o.o.r. ".>
.s.t. .s.t. .d
.e n.t.<./.c. .u
. n. .>.<./. .n.s
.w.e. .>.
.. ?s.....qag..E.
... #Im .... ,... ..
.G.......T.. .P.
@..G ............
.. 4t.
I . . .E. R. .I.
N .o. .5.t. . d.
.n.t.A.n.s.w.e.
r.s. .V.A.L.U.
2.,. .@.3.,. .G
E.T.D.A.T.E.(.)
.8......48
2. .n.v.a.r.c.h
.....@.2.. ...
.. .C.L.P. .6..
@. 3.. .
29
40
32
61
20
04
do
40
0000 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 00 Of bO 71 61 67 08 00 45 00 . .?s.....qag. .E.
0010 01 f6 Oc 35 40 00 7f 06 b8 52 80 1e la f7 80 le ... 5@....R......
0020 la 47 fO b4 05 99 8c 3a Ob 93 ac dd 7d 07 50 18 .G.....:....}3.P.
0030 40 9a aO 9b 00 00 17 03 01 01 c9 51 46 94 4a 00 @..........QF.J.
0040 29 ec 34 d2 3b b9 e5 8a 15 59 94 a4 cO 14 d6 cc ).4.;....Y......
0050 30 5b al 08 9d d2 37 45 f7 bb 48 59 3f 97 48 07 0[.... HY?.H.
0060 cf 61 aO df 77 45 4e f2 90 98 29 b7 ci 02 e8 58 .a.. N... ...X
0070 ef dl e2 97 00 25 2c d7 f2 bO 3d 38 62 35 8a 58 ... .%,...= 5.x
0080 c2 de 8f 63 c8 94 5a 8e 60 Od 5f 22 4a fc c8 48 . ..Z .. J .H
0090 41 8f cd d7 6a Id Oa b6 e6 96 61 07 13 36 80 ee A. ...... a..
OOaO dd ce al ad 94 56 3e 3e d8 ac cc dl 4d 84 89 89 . ... V>>....M.
00bO 88 6c f6 f5 9b dd 85 31 af 72 e8 95 9c 2a 73 bd ....... 1.r... *5
00co e8 90 d4 8f cc 9c bl 4f 18 el f3 78 b6 3a Of cl ...... 0...x.:.
QOdO 66 49 54 2b f5 d4 10 de fo 2f f3 cd 54 75 86 82 IT+...../..Tu..
OOeO 21 80 61 50 e4 55 bi b8 f8 ad 5a 3e 59 b3 a6 43 ..aP.U. ... .Z>Y..
OOfO a7 80 28 el 46 6b 3a Se 37 bf 18 9b do f2 da bi ..(.Fk:.7.......
0100 00 79 51 8b 33 4b da 2b 26 b3 02 68 bb e7 b5 5f .yQ.3K.+&..h..._
0110 32 92 2a 3e e8 b6 37 66 40 5c 74 e2 ed 11 37 d5 2.*>..7f@\t... 7.
0120 9d 9d cc 7e bc bd 8d 56 55 23 5f 20 2f ab 21 56 ... ~.. .vu# /. !v
0130 4f 9c 78 90 c4 eO f5 30 7c ad f8 7e a5 el 16 al o.x.... 01.......
0140 c7 31 cd 7c 2b 72 d6 ff 60 11 4c be 75 e5 dd ab .1. j+r.. '.L.U...
0150 86 33 fa 76 29 42 ec 02 eO 7d 41 b6 ad 5b 4d 54 .3.v)B... IA..[MT
0160 fc 80 03 bc al 48 Oe Id ac bd 30 2e 6e 3f ae 43 ..... H.... .n?.C
0170 d6 d8 a3 a9 18 29 98 fd da 8e 7f 48 3c 05 ci fd ..... ).....H<...
0180 cf 6b 77 8c 5c f9 39 9d 64 39 09 78 57 55 5e 51 .kw.\.9.d9.xwuAQ
0190 36 3d 08 e9 25 47 90 52 bi ea 6b 3b 3e ee 3a 88 =..%G.R..k;>.
OlaO 05 25 Oe eO c2 2a le 85 3b eb 06 Bc cb cf 03 24 %...W..;......
OlbO e3 e7 59 b3 ee eb lb 47 73 e4 09 e6 98 df 36 3c .. Y.... GS.....6
01cO 36 db d7 03 59 2f cd 48 aa 89 ba f3 96 c8 a4 7a 6 .. Y/.H.......
OldO c4 40 fd 4d 53 7a 87 8c 71 3f c2 81 Ob 9f 8a fl . .mSz..q?....
OleO 47 82 bd d7 3a 19 Oc 93 ff e8 57 ft 28 2c 97 12 G. ....... (..
O1fO 26 87 88 15 a8 dd 82 7c e3 69 82 4b dd e2 44 e6 &.. ... I.i.K. D.
0200 fe e5 26 Oa .. &.
0000 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 00 Of bO 71 61 67 08 00 45 00 .. ?S ..... qag..E.
0010 01 43 Oc 37 40 00 7f 06 b9 03 80 le la f7 80 le .C.7@...........
0020 la 47 fO b4 05 99 8c 3a Od be ac dd 7d 74 50 18 .G.....:....}]tP.
0030 40 2d al e6 00 00 17 03 01 01 16 e3 9c a2 9a ee @-..............
0040 86 bO a3 Of 63 d4 66 bf 13 dl 28 bc 78 f7 fl c4 .... c.f...(.x...
0050 d9 84 ce 3c 13 de 7e 87 e9 34 07 bO Oe 15 ic Oa ... <..-..4......
0060 2b d2 a9 64 Id fe 87 02 af 32 ca ca 25 ab c3 34 +.. d. ... %..4
0070 Sc 45 5b 52 cd 37 ac 99 eO 47 fb b8 ef 45 7e 15 \E .7.. .G...
0080 96 2e 22 6e d7 47 ie c9 08 73 13 2e 75 le a8 9b .. n.G ..... U.
0090 aa 54 91 74 la 49 65 28 27 82 fd 04 e7 la 94 f3 . .t.Ie(.......
OOaO 44 53 02 7e 58 60 e7 84 2c c2 3c 70 8d af 13 53 s.-x .. ,.<p...
OObO f4 4d ld 18 dc dd ce 98 36 a9 ab 71 ci 5a d4 ea .M......6..q.Z..
00cO 68 41 12 89 72 c9 82 25 db 82 47 52 1c 64 e6 f4 hA..r..%..GR.d..
QOdO b9 20 4f a7 5a 15 12 d9 3b di Ob 3f 80 fa 28 6b . o.z...;..?..(k
OOeO b3 10 e2 59 bf 13 47 ee 63 ic a2 ca bO c3 36 90 ...Y..G.C.....6.
OOfO 91 75 9e 66 a4 82 43 eb 84 ci e7 80 d6 63 f7 d6 .u.f...c......c..
0100 el f7 13 14 6e d8 22 3d 75 67 fb 00 7d c4 f2 e4 ... n."u
0110 22 92 ac 3d 7e la ff el fe 66 8e 9a Oe d3 25 8b %
0120 75 17 f6 ed 41 3c 9c 4b 9c 3a b7 94 e4 6a 38 44 ..A<.K.:...j
0130 ef 59 8e 9a 75 Of 47 b7 4f c5 58 53 bi 9d 87 86 . .u.G.0.XS.
0140 8c 46 c4 af 89 98 5d f8 92 fe ae 51 e7 21 d3 8c .F.. .].... ...
0150 cb
We have thus verified that the network traffic corresponding to student responses is
encrypted. Such encryption substantially decreases the likelihood of students being
able to acquire other students' submitted responses.
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7 Future work
There are a number of projects that would be interesting extensions of the system
described in this thesis.
One obvious extension is remote quiz-taking. This thesis only addresses quizzes that
are taken in the classroom. In a remote electronic quiz-taking scenario, the quiz is
posted online, and the students take it from any location outside of the classroom.
This type of quiz is an electronic version of a take-home exam. Our encryption
method works just as well for the remote scenario as for the in-class scenario and
probably would not need to be changed. The remote scenario has the same
fundamental cheating concerns as the classroom version, but also presents additional
opportunities for cheating. The method of student authentication we used for the in-
class scenario, i.e. student logon with a quiz-specific password, may not be
appropriate in the remote scenario. Providing a password at quiz start time would be
possible if students started the quiz at the same time. An encrypted message
containing the password could be sent to all logged in students, for example. In
addition, if the remote quiz is to be taken at a certain time by all students, database
access can be disabled until the time of the quiz. If it is acceptable that the students
take the quiz at any time, they can be given a password in advance and a timer can be
implemented that would track when a student logs in and forces the student to log
out after a certain amount of time has passed. Note that this method has the potential
for more cheating than requiring a designated start time, since one student can take
the quiz first and disclose the questions to another student.
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Another issue to consider with remote quiz-taking is how to ensure that only students
registered for the class log in to the tablets. One method would be to run a script on
the tablet that would check the student user name against a list of registered students.
As each class is likely to have such a list of students stored in the central database,
adding this functionality would be quite easy.
Another addition to the system would be to extend the aggregator to help detect
cheating. It could use its similarity metrics and clustering methods to find entries
that are similar and unusual [Smith, 2006]. The clustering would be enhanced by
providing functionality that would allow the system to automatically detect the
location of tablets and provide the aggregator with that information. In this way, the
aggregator could also check answer similarity for students sitting near each other.
An addition that would make quiz administration more efficient is the automated
grading of the quizzes once they are submitted to the database.
It would be interesting to analyze the behavior of the system when it is up and
running. Shrobe discusses a system that performs "Computational Vulnerability
Analysis" to adaptively determine what vulnerabilities are present in a system
[Shrobe, 2002]. This system can be used in CLP to help determine if the system has
been compromised, for example by students' unauthorized access to the database.
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One of the most interesting extensions would be to integrate handwriting recognition
with the authentication. "Distinctive Touch" [Kleek, 2004] is a system that was
developed to authenticate users by what the developers call a passdoodle, which is a
handwritten "doodle" drawn by the user in digital ink which acts as a user name and
password. Distinctive touch enhances handwriting recognition so that it would be
appropriate to authenticate a user. In addition to identifying the sketch, Distinctive
Touch also looks at stroke order and the speed that the sketch is drawn.
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8 Summary and Contributions
This thesis analyzes the security risks associated with using CLP to electronically
administer a quiz in class, implements an infrastructure which reduces those risks,
and lays the groundwork for future enhancements. The system which is
implemented can be used to authenticate students to the database and to ensure that
the database network traffic is not readable by unauthorized individuals. We discuss
the vulnerabilities in the current implementation and ways to increase the trust in the
system, as well as a number of projects to expand the system.
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